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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
First Amendment 9 Freedom of The Press 9 Access of News
Media to County fail
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 2588 (1978).
T HE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT in Houchins v. KQED' ruled that
the press enjoys no greater first amendment rights than the public itself.
A four to three majority of the Court held that newsmen have no constitu-
tional right to greater access to state institutions, specifically prisons, than
that of the general public.' Mr. Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the
majority, stated:
Neither the First nor Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the news
media the right of access to government information or sources of
information beyond that available to the public generally and thus
the federal district court abused its discretion by enjoining jail officials
from denying news media representatives access to jail facilities at
reasonable times for purposes of interviewing inmates and making
sound recordings, films and photographs.'
Although United States history is replete with struggles over the rights
and prerogatives of the press, until recently these disputes rarely made their
way to the nation's highest court.' In the last several years the Supreme
Court has been confronted with a number of important, complex questions
dealing with the role of a free press in a free society.'
First amendment rights of free speech and freedom of the press have
historically been given the greatest protection by the courts.' The protection
given these rights has been fashioned to assure the unfettered interchange
of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people After the enactment of the fourteenth amendment, the "consti-
198 S. Ct. 2588 (1978).
2 Id.
8 Id. at 2595.
4 Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 632 (1975).
5 See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,
418 U.S. 241 (1974); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Bradenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Red Lion Broadcast-
ing Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1969); New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).6 Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REv. 731, 752 (1977); See also
Rehnquist, The First Amendment: Freedom, Philosophy, and the Law, 12 GONZAGA L. REV.
1, 2 (1976); A. BiCKEL, THm LEAST DANGOmous BRANCH (1962); Mendelson, On the Mean-
ing of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CAL. L. REa. 821 (1962).
T Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
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tutional framework was modified, and by the 1920's the Court had estab-
lished that the protections of the first amendment extend against all govern-
ment-federal, state, and local."8 Furthermore, in such recent cases as Pell
v. Procunier, Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,"0 Procunier v. Martinez,"
and Branzburg v. Hayes,2 the Court has endeavored to delineate specific
constitutional guidelines for the press to follow in obtaining news stories.
In the eyes of the Burger majority, the Court has only reaffirmed these de-
cisions with the KQED decision.
The case originated when in late March, 1975, a public television station,
KQED, reported the suicide of an inmate in the Greystone section of the
Santa Rita Jail in Alameda County, California. The newscast concluded with
a statement by a psychiatrist employed by the facility that the conditions in
the Greystone section were responsible for mental illnesses of inmates and
a denial by Sheriff Houchins that prison conditions were in any way respon-
sible for the prisoners' mental problems.'
The jail is located in a remote section of the county. It had previously
been a barracks before being converted into a prison facility in 1947. In
1972, five inmates brought suit against the former sheriff, charging that
confinement in the Greystone section of Santa Rita Jail constituted cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. District Judge
Zirpoli personally visited the facility and declared:
[t]he Greystone section violated basic standards of human decency...
and shocked the conscience of the court. The heating, ventilation,
plumbing and sanitation were obviously and grossly substandard....
The conditions at Greystone were truly deplorable and the shocking and
debasing conditions which prevailed there constituted cruel and unusual
punishment for man or beast as a matter of law.'
KQED requested permission from Sheriff Houchins to visit and film
s Stewart, supra note 4, at 632.
9 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
10417 U.S. 843 (1974).
21416 U.S. 396 (1974).
"2 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
is 98 S. Ct. at 2591.
14 Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 130 (N.D. Cal. 1972). It was argued in
Houchins that:
After the district court's ruling many necessary improvements were made to alleviate
the cruel and unusual conditions of imprisonment that had prevailed at Greystone.
Nevertheless, the conditions are still far from ideal. Consequently, plans for new and
expensive construction of county jail facilities are being debated and considered by
the elected officials and the people of Alameda County.
Brief for Respondent at 23, Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 2588 (1978).
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the Greystone area but the latter refused to grant his necessary permission."
The Santa Rita Jail was, for all practical purposes, closed to both the media
and the general public. Limited visitation was allowed to attorneys, clergy,
relatives and friends of the inmates. However, these visits included access only
to specifically designated areas of the jail.
KQED brought the action against Sheriff Houchins under 42 U.S.C.
section 1983 claiming deprivation of its first amendment rights.16 The county
thereafter liberalized its visitation policy by conducting regular monthly
tours, open both to the public and news media. Nevertheless, the tours did
not include the Little Greystone section of the jail, interviews with inmates,
or the use of cameras and tape recorders."
KQED contended that such restrictions failed to "provide any effective
means by which the public could be informed of conditions prevailing in
the Greystone facility or learn of the prisoners' grievances.""8 Sheriff Houchins
argued, however, that unregulated access by the news media to the jail would
infringe inmate privacy and tend to create "jail celebrities," who consequently
would tend to generate internal problems and undermine security. Houchins
also feared that administration of the jail would become aggravated and dis-
oriented through unscheduled media tours. 9 Furthermore, he asserted that
the visitation program in effect met constitutional requirements imposed by
the first amendment."
The district court preliminarily enjoined petitioner from denying KQED
and other responsible members of the press reasonable access to all areas
of the jail. Furthermore, the media was not to be restricted in its use of
video or audio equipment or from conducting inmate interviews.2" The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling.22
isKQED v. Houchins, 546 F.2d 284, 285 (9th Cir. 1976).
16 98 S. Ct. at 2591.
if Id. at 2592.
as Id.
10 Id.
20 Oddly, Sheriff Houchins' beliefs on the presence of the news media in jail facilities con-
trasted sharply with those of then neighboring San Francisco County Sheriff, Richard D.
Hongisto. In an affidavit introduced by KQED, Hongisto stated that he had allowed KQED
to do a ninety minute live program from San Francisco County Jail at San Bruno on
February 2, 1972. Hongisto found no difficulty in protecting the privacy of the inmates
nor did the media's presence create any need for increased security. Consequently, Hongisto
later authorized interior shots and filming of four other correctional facilities in San Fran-
cisco County. Hongisto summed up his position on the situation as follows: "In my opinion
jails are public institutions and the public has a right to know what is being done with their
tax dollars that are being spent on jail facilities and programs." Brief for petitioner at 14-15,
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 98 S. Ct. 2588 (1978).
21 546 F.2d at 285.
12 Id. at 284.
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Mr. Justice Rehnquist, in his role as circuit justice, stayed the mandate
and in his opinion on the stay application stated:
The legal issue to be raised by applicant's petition for certiorari seems
quite clear. If the "no greater access doctrine" of Pell and Saxbe applies
to this case, the Court of Appeals and the District Court were wrong,
and the injunction was an abuse of discretion. If, on the other hand, the
holding in Pell is to be viewed as impliedly limited to the situation
where there already existed substantial press and public access to the
prison, then Pell and Saxbe are not necessarily dispositive, and review
by this court of the propriety of the injunction, in light of those cases,
would be appropriate, although not necessary. "
Consequently, the majority in KQED adopted Rehnquist's first view of the
issue while the dissent believed that the second set of circumstances was
controlling.
While recognizing the maxim that conditions in jails and prisons are
clearly matters "of great public importance,"2 Chief Justice Burger declared
that the "media are not a substitute or an adjunct of government.., and
are ill-equipped to deal with problems of prison administration." 5 Burger
contended that the press enjoys no constitutional rights of access to either
prisons or any other sources of governmental information.
The majority saw the issue not as a right to receive ideas and informa-
tion but as a claim of special privilege to access. Ironically, Chief Justice
Burger sought to fortify his opinion by quoting liberally from Zemel v. Rusk
in which a noted protector of free speech, former Chief Justice Warren stated:
[t]here are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by
ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow. For example, the
prohibition of unauthorized entry into the White House diminishes the
citizen's opportunities to gather information he might find relevant to
his opinion of the way the country is being run, but that does not make
entry into the White House a First Amendment right. The right to speak
and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather in-
formation.2"
However, Chief Justice Warren's decision dealt with a completely differ-
ent, and only vaguely related legal problem. Zemel upheld the denial of a
United States citizen's request to have his passport validated for travel to
Cuba as a tourist to study the effects of American foreign policy on the
Cuban people. The first amendment argument was ancillary to the decision.
23 429 U.S. 1341, 1344 (1977).
2, PeU v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 830 n.7.
25 98 S. Ct. at 2594.
* Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965).
[V/ol. 12:2
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The Court, in upholding the Secretary of State's right to deny the passport,
based its decision mainly on the constitutionality of the Passport Act of 1926.27
The Court saw the issue as involving the powers of the executive branch to
conduct foreign affairs and ruled acordingly.
Furthermore, Chief Justice Burger's decision affords a very narrow
reading of Pell and Saxbe. The prisons in those cases permitted liberal media
access that was sufficient to insure against concealment of conditions or
events of public concern." The restriction attacked in Pell was a rule pro-
hibiting face-to-face interviews between news media representatives and indi-
vidual inmates.
Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for a six-member majority, held that be-
cause alternative channels of communication existed, the rule did not abridge
the inmates' freedom of speech.29 In the second part of his opinion (ex-
pressing the views of five members of the Court) Stewart held that the rule
did not interfere with the news media representative's freedom of the press
since the regulation did not deny the press access to sources of information
available to members of the general public."0
Saxbe involved the constitutionality of a policy statement of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons which prohibited interviews between members of the press
and "individually designated federal prison inmates.""' The Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the policy statement since it did not deny
members of the news media access to sources of information available to
members of the general public. For example, unlike the situation at the
Alameda jail, newsmen were permitted to photograph any prison facility on
the tours of correctional institutions."2 They could conduct brief interviews
with any inmates they might encounter and any mail between newsmen and
prisoners was "neither censored nor inspected." 3
Chief Justice Burger concluded in Houchins by stating that it was essen-
tially a legislative decision whether or not penal institutions should be opened
to the press.3 ' He also argued that a number of alternatives are available to
prevent problems in penal facilities from escaping public attention. These
include citizen task forces and prison visitation committees, grand juries,
investigations conducted by a prosecutor or member of the judiciary, and
2T Id. at 18.
28 417 U.S. at 829.
29 Id. at 824-28.
30 Id. at 833-34.
31 Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 844 (1974).
w Id. at 847.
35 Id.
34 98 S. Ct. at 2596.
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investigation by the legislature."5 In addition, California has a prison Board
of Corrections that has the power to inspect prisons and jails and is required
to make its findings available to the public."
Concurring, Mr. Justice Stewart agreed that the press has no greater
right of access to information than the public but concluded that KQED
should have been granted limited injunctive relief. 7 In effect, Justice Stewart
declared that the press should be allowed to use the audio and visual equip-
ment of their profession in order to convey the "jail's sights and sounds" to
members of the public who cannot personally visit the place. 8 Nevertheless,
Justice Stewart seemed to adopt the view that if the public is excluded from
a right of access to a governmental source of information, then the press
may constitutionally be excluded, too. He stated:
[i]n two respects, however, the District Court's preliminary injunction
was overbroad. It ordered the Sheriff to permit reporters into the Little
Greystone facility and it required him to let them interview randomly
encountered inmates. In both these respects, the injunction gave the
press access to areas and sources of information from which persons
on the public tours had been excluded, and thus enlarged the scope of
what the Sheriff and County Supervisors had opened to public view."'
The newest member of the Court, Mr. Justice Stevens, with whom Mr.
Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Powell joined, delivered a vigorous dissent.
He held that Pell and Saxbe were not controlling in the present case since
the press already had liberal access to view the conditions in the prisons in
those cases. " Justice Stevens voiced concern that the very limited access
available to the press in Houchins would not adequately and constitutionally
protect the public's first amendment rights of free speech. He pointed
to the Court's past decisions in Zemel and Branzburg as implying that there
is a right to acquire knowledge that merits protection from the first amend-
ment:
[w]e do not question the significance of free speech, press or assembly
to the country's welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does
not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection
for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."
Justice Stevens argued that the full and free flow of information of a gen-
85 Id. at 2597.
361d. at 2596-97.
37 Id. at 2598 (Stewart, J., concurring).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 2599.
401d. at 2599-600 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61 408 U.S. at 681.
[Vol. 12:2
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eral nature has long been recognized as a core objective of the first amendment
of the Constitution:' 2
Without some protection for the acquisition of information about the
operation of public institutions such as prisons by the public at large,
the process of self-governance contemplated by the Framers would be
stripped of its substance. For that reason information-gathering is en-
titled to some measure of constitutional protection."3
He concluded by recognizing the differences between excluding the
press from the confidential policy and decision-making groups gathered in
executive session and the exclusion of the press from a public correctional
facility. He pointed out that,
[w]hile prison officials have an interest in the time and manner of public
acquisition of information about the institutions they administer, there
is no legitimate, penological justification for concealing from citizens the
conditions in which their fellow citizens are being confined."
A liberal or broad interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision may
have a "chilling" effect on the ability of the press to investigate important
governmental news stories. It seems likely under this construction of the
decision that if a governmental body adopted a policy excluding both the
public and the press from information within its control, such policy would
be ruled constitutional by today's Court. The Court upheld a policy that
needlessly limited inquiry into the official conduct and conditions in a local
jail whose largest category of inmates were those charged with violations of
the motor vehicle statutes.' 5
The Court has seemingly ignored the maxim that first amendment pro-
tections for gathering and publishing the news "are not for the benefit of the
press so much as for the benefit of all of us."" It is vital that the press possess
strong investigatory powers so that the freedoms guaranteed by the Consti-
tution may be preserved. In the words of one commentator:
A free press, as provided for in the First Amendment, occupies an im-
portant place in the American political system. The special role of the
press is to provide citizens with the information necessary to make de-
cisions about public policies and public officials. The collection and
dissemination of such information cannot be accomplished effectively
42 98 S. Ct. at 2605.
4 sId. at 2606.
"4 Id. at 2608.
45 See Brief for Respondent at 18, 98 S. Ct. 2588.
4 "Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).
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by individuals acting on their own behalf; some degree of profession-
alism and organization is required."7
However, other constitutional experts may argue that the decision
should be read narrowly in view of the facts of the case. A prison is a special
facility requiring stringent security measures and press coverage must be
tempered by this circumstance. 8 Houchins might also be viewed as simply a
holding to prevent the press from exercising power in excess of that which
it is granted by the Constitution. The power of a strong investigative press
has constantly been revealed throughout the last decade."
Nevertheless, this rapid growth of the power of the news media is a
matter of concern to some commentators. Many feel that the press has be-
come "too big." Most Americans now receive their information from gigantic
news organizations that rival major corporations in size." Many also believe
that the press has become too ruthless in uncovering the news. 1
Thus, the Court's decision may be construed as a means to contain
within the limits of the Constitution the rampant growth of the investigative
powers of the press. This line of reasoning contends that our system of gov-
ernment has three official branches of power, and one unofficial branch -
the press. When one branch gains too much power, it not only threatens the
other branches but endangers our entire constitutional fabric of government.
In this fast-moving computerized time more and more people must
depend upon the news media to discover what is happening in their complex
world. The average person does not have either the time or the resources to
personally investigate his government. He relies heavily on the press and in-
creasingly on the electronic media to bring him the news. It has been re-
ported in a recent study that sixty-four percent of the American people
receive the bulk of their news from television.5
Prisons are also unique among public institutions in that their function
' 
t Comment, Right of the Press to Gather Information After Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PA.
L REv. 166, 175 (1975).
48 Comment, Bans on Interviews of Prisoners: Prisoner and Press Rights After Pell and Saxbe,
9 U.S.F.L REv. 718, 720 (1975). See also D. DUFFEE, CORRECTIONAL POLICY AND PRISON
ORGANIZATION (1975); H. BuRms, CoaREcTIONS ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRnON (1975).
49 The press played a major role in turning American public opinion against the war in Viet-
nam. Absent the diligence and veracity of the press, the evils of Watergate, which eventually
destroyed a president, would never have been exposed. See BuRNs, PELTASON, AND CRONIN,
GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE 270-271 (9th Ed. 1975); WORTON, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
PaSS (1975). For an opposite view, see Epstein, Did the Press Uncover Watergate? COM-
ME1TARY, July, 1974, at 21-24.
0 MEDIA CASEBooK, 48 & 49 (Sandman ed. 1972).
52 Anti-press Backlash in Courts, U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, June 12, 1978, at 40.
62 The Roper Organization, Changing Public Attitudes Toward TV and other Mass Media
1959-1976 3 (May, 1977).
[Vol. 12:2
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is to involuntarily confine and isolate certain of society's members; these
prisons' "invisibility presents the risk of the abuse of individual liberties.
53
The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals
has stated that: "[riepresentatives of the media should be allowed access to
all correctional facilities for reporting items of public interest consistent with
the preservation of offenders' privacy."5'
In future access to information cases that the Court will most certainly
be called upon to decide, the words of Mr. Justice White, writing for the
Supreme Court in Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn," should be re-
membered:
In the first place, in a society in which each individual has but limited
time and resources with which to observe at first hand the operations
of his government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him
in convenient form the facts of those operations. Great responsibility
is accordingly placed upon the news media to report fully and accurately
the proceedings of government, and official records and documents open
to the public are the basic data of governmental operations."
Finally, these few, but significant words of a newspaper editor must also
be remembered: "Someone once said a free press is the price a democracy
has to pay for freedom. Others, less eloquent, have described a free press as
a necessary evil, something to be suffered and lived with, to attain a higher
goal of individual and social freedom."5
THOMAS W. RENWAND
55 Brief for Respondent at 22, 98 S. Ct. 2588.
"Id. at 8.
55 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
8e ld. at 491-92.
5 t Akron Beacon Journal, February 4, 1979, at G2.
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